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Abstract
The “making” of the modern world cannot be divorced from the all-
permeating influence of the modern natural sciences. Although the 
Renaissance spirit, aimed at exploring the possibilities of human rationality 
in an unrestricted way, initially proceeded from the conviction that the human 
personality ought to be appreciated as both free and autonomous (in the 
sense of being a law-unto-itself), the successes of the natural sciences ruled 
ththe day for quite some time. During the Age of Enlightenment (the 18  
century) Immanuel Kant established the influential separation of “science” 
and “faith”  later on known in the form of the opposition between facts and 
values. The dominance of positivism and neo-positivism during the first half 
thof the 20  century continued the legacy of the natural science ideal but 
slowly but certainly it had to give way to the emerging dominant trends of the 
thsecond half of the 20  century  particularly the post World War two 
existentialism, language philosophy, neo-Marxism, the hermeneutical 
tradition up to the most recent “grand” claims of the postmodernism against 
“grand met narratives”. A brief analysis of the relationship between culture 
and civilization (with special reference to the views of MacIver) terminates in 
some systematic perspective on the meaning and the future task of science 
and scholarship.
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1. Orientation
After the so-called “dark Middle Ages” gave way for the adventurous and 
th thexplorative spirit of the Renaissance during the 14  and 15  centuries, 
Western Europe was increasingly astonished by remarkable and many times 
mind-boggling developments, particularly within the natural sciences. The 
authority of Plato and Aristotle as well as the position of power occupied by 
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the Roman Catholic Church disintegrated under the attack from a radical new 
orientation.
The Renaissance is first of all supposed to be a reaching back to Greek 
antiquity, but in fact it embodies the enthronement of the human being. 
Traditional cultures merged into “mother nature” many times did not 
appreciate the cultural calling of humankind  something explicitly done by the 
cultural orientations of ancient Greece and Rome as well as by India and 
China. In these cultures humankind explored an awareness of the fact that it is 
not merely an extension of nature and that it has to transform nature into 
culture.
2. Early modern rationalism and the 
successes of the mathematical natural 
sciences
The Renaissance spirit moved a step ahead, for it gave birth to the modern 
deification of the human being as such. Not in nature and also not within the 
domain of culture the ultimate anchor could be found. When Descartes 
launched his methodical doubt in order to arrive at the conviction “I think, 
hence I am” it was built on an underlying new certainty  the trust in the 
(infallibility) of human reason. The new discoveries of the rising natural 
1sciences  Galileo,   Kepler and particularly those of Newton  underscored this 
unbridled adoration of human rationality. Although contemporaries of 
Newton, like Leibniz and Huygens, question his newly found “law of gravity” 
(according to which the force of gravity equals the product of the masses of 
two bodies divided by the square of the distance between them), because 
they did not know how to imagine the effects of a “force” without an 
intermediate mechanical device. But the subsequent history testified to an 
exploration of the scope of Newton's formulation of the law of gravity that 
confirmed the incredibly powerful insights entailed in it. One only has to recall 
the story about the discovery of Neptune.
With the aid of his newly designed powerful telescope W. Herschel 
discovered the planet Uranus in 1781. The problem was that the path of this 
planet did not obey the predictions made for it. Alexander Bouvard 
conjectured that this deviation was the effect of another  yet unknown  planet. 
Various attempts were made to observe or calculate the possible size and 
path of this unknown planet. In 1845 a young student from Cambridge, J.C. 
1 Maier discovered that the formulation of the law of inertia was anticipated by scholars from the transitional period between the Middel Ages 
and the Renaissance (see Maier, 1964)
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Adams, on the basis of Newton's law of gravity, calculated a highly accurate 
estimate of the mass, position and path of this unknown planet and sent his 
calculations to sir George Airy at the “Royal Astronomical Observatory” in 
Greenwich. The latter failed to appreciate the significance of these 
calculations  which gave another student, the Frenchman J.J. Leverrier, the 
chance independently to come up with approximately the same calculations. 
He communicated his findings to the German astronomer, Johann Galle. 
Galle received them on September 23, 1846 and he discovered Neptune that 
same evening  with a deviation of only 55 minutes off the path as predicted by 
Leverrier. Kline is certainly justified in asking the question how one can doubt 
the predictive power of a mathematical-astronomical theory that manages to 
make predictions accurate up to one ten thousandth of a percentage point. 
And this additional historical perspective may also help to come to a better 
appreciation of the assessment of Alexander Pope, who wrote: 
“Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night:
God said: Let Newton be! and all was light.”
3. The Enlightenment ideal “Progress”  the
 culmination-point of modern rationalism
thWhereas the 17  century intellectually belonged to its two genial 
thpersonalities, Leibniz and Newton, the 18  century is overshadowed by the 
great German philosophy Immanuel Kant. At the age of 57 (in 1781) he 
published his influential and famous Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). This work 
sets out to regain human freedom that got lost during the preceding success 
story of the mathematical natural sciences. Kant realized that this process 
actually proceeded from and was rooted in the ideal of the Renaissance, 
namely to proclaim the autonomous freedom of humankind. In the Preface to 
the second edition of this work it is plainly stated that all of life ought to be 
subjected to the scrutiny of human reason. “Our age is the genuine age of 
criticism to which everything should be subjected. Religion through its 
sanctity, and legislation through its majesty, may want to exempt themselves 
from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim sincere respect 
which reason only confers to that which has been able to sustain the scrutiny 
of free and open examination” (Kant, 1781-A:xii). Yet, when reality in its totality 
is reduced to and subsumed under general natural scientific categories, such 
as the relation between cause and effect (causality), then this original 
freedom ideal is seriously threatened. The way in which Kant attempted to 
overcome this threat was to fall back on a classical distinction  which he 
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employed in service of his aim to safe-guard human freedom one again.
By employing the classical Greek distinction between essence and 
appearance (substance and accidents) Kant restricted the science ideal to 
the chaotic sensory impressions (the appearances or phenomena)  which 
meant that the natural sciences cannot encompass the practical (moral) 
freedom of the human personality as a supersensory “thing-in-itself” 
2 (noumenal “Ding an sich”). The personality ideal of autonomous freedom 
was accommodated within the domain of “practical reason”  also giving 
shelter to “faith”. His famous statement is: “I have therefore found it necessary 
3 thto deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith”. Later in the 19  century 
Ernst Haeckel provided the equivalent of this Kantian claim with his view that 
science commences where faith terminates.
4. The idol of the “scientific method” 
the limitations of “verification”
thBy and large the effect of this mixed tradition was that it passed on to the 20  
century a dialectical tension between the natural sciences and the humanities. 
Positivism (Ernst Mach) and neo-positivism (the Vienna Circle  thinkers such 
as Neurath, Hahn, Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach and Ayer) continued Kant's 
emphasis on sensory impressions by claiming that all reliable knowledge is 
based upon sense experience. The concept of a chair is then merely viewed 
as a logical construction from sense-data, and even the concept of the “a 
logical construction out of individual people” (Ayer, 1967:63). Particularly 
influential was the positivistic emphasis on the so-called “scientific method”. 
According to it scientific investigations always start with observations, 
proceed to the formulation of conjectures (hypotheses) and their testing 
(“empirical verification”) which may result  if the test against “sense data” is 
successful  in verified hypotheses or scientific theories.
The initial idea of empirical verification within the Vienna Circle was, as 
explained by Hempel, “that a sentence was said to have empirical meaning if 
it was capable, at least in principle, of complete verification by observational 
evidence; i.e., if observational evidence could be described which, if actually 
obtained, would conclusively establish the truth of the sentence” (Hempel, 
41959:110).   
The crucial question, of course, is whether a mere generalization (also known 
2 “The common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances here manifests its injurious influence, to the confounding 
reason  For if appearances are things in themselves, freedom cannot be upheld” (my italics in the last sentence  D S ; 564; “Denn, sind 
Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten”)  At the same time Kant elevated human understanding (with its 
categories) to be the formal law-giver of nature (see Strauss, 1982)
3 ; 'Ich musste also dat Wissen aufheben, um zum Glauben Platz zu bekommen,' (1787, B,xxx
 Another formulation given bby Hempel reads: “A sentence has empirical meaning if and only if it is not analytic and follows logically from 
some finite and logically consistent class of observation sentences” (Hempel, 1959:111)
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as induction) could provide a foundation for the alleged universal validity of 
(natural) laws? Empirical verification, after all, can do nothing more but check 
a limited number of instances without providing any support for the 
universality (unlimited validity) of the derived law. Ayer mentions the example 
of the natural law: all bodies expand when they are heated. A certain limited 
number of physical bodies could be investigated empirically, but it is an 
impossible task even to begin testing all physical bodies. What then serves as 
the basis for the universality of the claim that all bodies expand when they are 
heated? Do we have any certainty that after a thousand or after a million tests 
we would not encounter a non-conforming body? Ayer is simply showing 
intellectual honesty when he concedes that no so-called empirical statement 
could ever be verified in a conclusive way. Empirical verification at most can 
render laws probable (Ayer, 1967:37).
With this approach Ayer actually distances himself from classical logical 
positivism and moves closer to the position taken by logical empiricists such 
as Carnap, Hempel and Nagel. The second foreword of Ayer's work from 1946 
is preceded by stating the empiricist criteria for knowledge acquisition which 
Hempel formulated already in 1942. The term confirmation substituted the 
term verification in the subsequent developments. In the Journal Mind 
Hempel published an article on Studies in the Logic of Confirmation and in the 
same year, together with Oppenheim, Hempel published an article on “A 
Definition of Degree of Confirmation” in the Journal: Philosophy of Science (cf. 
Passmore, 1966:419, 589-590). The meaning in which logical empiricism 
employs terms such as 'verification', 'falsification' and 'confirmation' is better 
explained in an article published by Hempel in 1950: The Empiricist Criterion 
of Meaning (Vol.4: Revue Internationale de Philosophie) (cf. also Hempel, 
1959:111 note 6). In this article Hempel points out that the so-called 
“verification principle” has “several serious defects: The verifiability 
requirement rules out all sentences of universal form and thus all statements 
purporting to express general laws; for these cannot be conclusively verified 
by any finite set of observational data. And since sentences of this type 
constitute an integral part of scientific theories, the verifiability requirement 
must be regarded as overly restrictive in this respect. Similarly, the criterion 
disqualifies all sentences such as “For any substance there exists some 
solvent,” which contain both universal and existential quantifiers (i.e., 
occurrences of the terms “all” and “some” or their equivalents); for no 
sentences of this kind can be logically deduced from any finite set of 
5observation sentences (Hempel, 1959:112).  
5  Remarks made by the author in 1958 in respect of this article states: “The remaining arguments mentioned in section 2 of my article seems to 
me fully sufficient, however, to disqualify both complete verifiability and complete falsifiability as criteria of cognitive significance” 
(Hempel, 1959:128)
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5. From induction to falsification: Karl Popper
As critical neopositivist Karl Popper grasped the opportunity to draw further 
devastating consequences. According to him there is no such a thing as 
induction  accept in the science of mathematics. The new criterion posed by 
Popper is given in the demand that every scientific statement should in 
principle be open to falsification. In order to ascertain the falsity of a statement 
one only has to check one instance. Over against verification Popper 
formulates the requirement of falsification. Popper is even convinced that if we 
don't want to invalidate many natural scientific disciplines, we have to accept 
that every discipline employs many concepts which cannot be verified 
empirically (Popper, 1968:40 ff.).
With an astute critical edge Popper attacks the mistaken naturalistic scientism 
which tries to impress a natural scientific methodology upon all sciences. He 
criticizes the prevalent problems hampering sociological methodology as 
follows: There exists, for example, the wrong and ill-informed methodological 
naturalism or scientism requiring that the social sciences have to learn from 
the natural sciences what scientific method is. This mistaken naturalism 
posits requirements such as: Start with observations and measurements; 
then proceed inductively to generalizations and theory formation. Along this 
road you will reach the ideal of scientific objectivity, in so far as this is indeed 
possible in the social sciences. This should be accompanied with a clear 
awareness that it is much more difficult to attain objectivity in the social 
sciences (if attainable at all) than in the natural sciences; for objectivity means 
freedom from values and the social scientist can only in the rarest of instances 
free himself to such an extent from the valuations of his own society that he is 
only slightly capable of achieving a freedom from values and slightly capable 
of reaching objectivity. According to me, so Popper proceeds, every one of 
these statements, ascribed by me to the wrong-headed naturalism, is 
ultimately false. They are based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
natural scientific method. It is directly founded in a myth  a myth which 
unfortunately appears too frequently, namely the influential myth of the 
inductive character of the scientific method and of the nature of scientific 
6objectivity.
It should be kept in mind that Popper “sought to overcome the gap the Wiener 
Kreis had opened between science and philosophy” (Hacohen, 2002:195). 
The positivist claim that “science” is independent from philosophy in is 
6  Popper, 1970:107  See in this context also the treatment of the scientific method in sociology as explained by PH  Mann (1968:13 ff )
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nothing but a comprehensive philosophical statement!
The crucial question, of course, is whether a mere generalization (also 
known as induction) could provide a foundation for the alleged universal 
validity of (natural) laws?
Empirical verification, after all, can do nothing more but check a limited 
number of instances without providing any support for the universality 
(unlimited validity) of the derived law. Ayer mentions the example of the 
natural law: all bodies expand when they are heated. A certain limited 
number of physical bodies could be investigated empirically, but it is an 
impossible task even to begin testing all physical bodies. What then serves 
as the basis for the universality of the claim that all bodies expand when they 
are heated? Do we have any certainty that after a thousand or after a million 
tests we would not encounter a non-conforming body?
Ayer is simply showing intellectual honesty when he concedes that no so-
called empirical statement could ever be verified in a conclusive way. 
Empirical verification at most can render laws probable (Ayer, 1967:37). 
With this approach Ayer actually distances himself from classical logical 
positivism and moves closer to the position taken by logical empiricists 
such as Carnap, Hempel and Nagel. The second foreword of Ayer's work 
from 1946 is preceded by stating the empiricist criteria for knowledge 
acquisition which Hempel formulated already in 1942. The term 
confirmation substituted the term verification in the subsequent 
developments. In the Journal Mind Hempel published an article on Studies 
in the Logic of Confirmation and in the same year, together with Oppenheim, 
Hempel published an article on “A Definition of Degree of Confirmation” in 
the Journal: Philosophy of Science (cf. Passmore, 1966:419, 589-590). The 
meaning in which logical empiricism employs terms such as 'verification', 
'falsification' and 'confirmation' is better explained in an article published by 
Hempel in 1950: The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning (Vol.4: Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie) (cf. also Hempel, 1959:111 note 6). In this 
article Hempel points out that the so-called “verification principle” has 
“several serious defects: The verifiability requirement rules out all 
sentences of universal form and thus all statements purporting to express 
general laws; for these cannot be conclusively verified by any finite set of 
observational data. And since sentences of this type constitute an integral 
part of scientific theories, the verifiability requirement must be regarded as 
overly restrictive in this respect. Similarly, the criterion disqualifies all 
sentences such as "For any substance there exists some solvent," which 
contain both universal and existential quantifiers (i.e., occurrences of the 
62
terms "all" and "some" or their equivalents); for no sentences of this kind can 
be logically deduced from any finite set of observation sentences (Hempel, 
71959:112).
As critical neopositivist Karl Popper grasped the opportunity to draw further 
devastating consequences. According to him there is no such a thing as 
induction  accept in the science of mathematics. The new criterion posed by 
Popper is given in the demand that every scientific statement should in 
principle be open to falsification. In order to ascertain the falsity of a statement 
one only has to check one instance. Over against verification Popper 
formulates the requirement of falsification. Popper is even convinced that if we 
don't want to invalidate many natural scientific disciplines, we have to accept 
that every discipline employs many concepts which cannot be verified 
empirically (Popper, 1968:40 ff.).
With an astute critical edge Popper attacks the mistaken naturalistic scientism 
which tries to impress a natural scientific methodology upon all sciences. He 
criticizes the prevalent problems hampering sociological methodology as 
follows: There exists, for example, the wrong and ill-informed methodological 
naturalism or scientism requiring that the social sciences have to learn from 
the natural sciences what scientific method is. This mistaken naturalism 
posits requirements such as: Start with observations and measurements; 
then proceed inductively to generalizations and theory formation. Along this 
road you will reach the ideal of scientific objectivity, in so far as this is indeed 
possible in the social sciences. This should be accompanied with a clear 
awareness that it is much more difficult to attain objectivity in the social 
sciences (if attainable at all) than in the natural sciences; for objectivity means 
freedom from values and the social scientist can only in the rarest of instances 
free himself to such an extent from the valuations of his own society that he is 
only slightly capable of achieving a freedom from values and slightly capable 
of reaching objectivity. According to me, so Popper proceeds, every one of 
these statements, ascribed by me to the wrong-headed naturalism, is 
ultimately false. They are based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
natural scientific method. It is directly founded in a myth  a myth which 
unfortunately appears too frequently, namely the influential myth of the 
inductive character of the scientific method and of the nature of scientific 
objectivity (Popper, 1970:107; cf. in this context the treatment of the scientific 
method in sociology as explained by P.H. Mann, 1968:13 ff.).
7
Remarks made by the author in 1958 in respect of this article states: “The remaining arguments mentioned in section 2 of my article seems to 
me fully sufficient, however, to disqualify both complete verifiability and complete falsifiability as criteria of cognitive significance” 
(Hempel, 1959:128)
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6. Neo-Marxism
8Harbermas, coming from the so-called Frankfurt school of neo-Marxism,  
nonetheless holds that there are still positivistic leftovers present in Popper's 
methodology. He points out that Popper wants to subjugate the accepted 
view of observation, reflection and transition as the origin of theories to his 
new method of testing, the method of falsification. Popper brings all 
knowledge back to the level of mere opinions which should constantly be 
tested anew. Even successful hypotheses at most provide us with a good 
conjecture but never with certain and proven knowledge. In addition to this, 
Habermas claims, we do encounter another source of knowledge serving as 
a foundation of Popper's method of falsification, namely the critically testing 
tradition. Tradition, in the final analysis, is the independent variable upon 
which both thought and observation as well as the procedure of testing 
depends. Habermas is convinced that Popper uncritically trusts the 
autonomy of experience organized in the procedure of testing. This hides the 
deeply rooted positivistic prejudice which Popper, in spite of everything else, 
still shares: He presupposes the epistemological independence of the facts 
with regard to the theories aiming at a descriptive understanding of these 
facts and their relationships. Testing, therefore, measures theories against the 
yardstick of 'independent' facts. This thesis is the weak spot in the 
problematical positivistic residue in Popper's thought (Habermas, 1970:241, 
cf. 239 ff.).
Although the Frankfurt school affirms Popper's reaction against a naturalistic 
positivism, it remains critical of his own positive position. Adorno declares that 
methods are not dependent upon a methodological ideal but much rather 
upon that which is investigated (Adorno, 1970:130). Popper implicitly 
accounts for this with the prominence he gives to the problem. This emphasis 
directs scientific labor towards the importance of problems  thus actually 
criticizing the numerous sociological investigations which try to assign 
primacy to sociological method in stead of acknowledging the primacy of that 
which is investigated. This primacy of method in the social sciences may be 
rooted in the desire to develop method for the sake of method, or even in 
order to select data for study in such a way that it could be studied with the 
available methods (Adorno, 1970:130).
Whereas for Popper a problem is something purely theoretical, Adorno wants 
to see a problem as something practical referring to a problematical state of 
affairs in reality (1970:129). This shift highlights the peculiar inclination of neo-
8  This school includes M  Horkheimer, T  Adorno and up to a certain level also H  Marcuse
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Marxism. It is not satisfied with a distanced registration of facts: “Whoever 
hands himself over to the data to be studied, does not reveal anything of 
himself and, in the final analysis, equates himself with a registering 
apparatus” (Adorno, 1970:131). Whoever upholds this attitude in empirical 
research frequently comes to unconvincing and irrelevant results:
It also entails that the assertions of empirical social research frequently have 
an inconclusive or peripheral character, or merely represent information for 
administrative purposes; and because of this, from the very outset they are 
not suitable for incorporation in relevantly posed theoretical problems. 
Unmistakable is the danger of mere data manipulation as busy work, such as 
ascertained by Robert S. Lynd in his book Knowledge for What? (Sociology 
and Empirical Social Research, in Adorno and Horkheimer, 1973:121).
Given his practical concern, Adorno gives the following twist to Popper's 
conception of formulating problems: “Only for those who can imagine a 
society different from the actually existing one society becomes, in Popper's 
word, a problem; only through that what it is not society is unveiled as what it 
is” (Adorno, 1970:132). For Adorno, therefore, sociology means criticism 
(Adorno, 1970:132): “critical sociology is, if its concepts are to be true, 
according to its own design necessarily at once societal criticism” (Adorno, 
1970:135). Also Habermas declares that an analysis of the coherence 
between knowledge and interests confirms the opinion that epistemological 
criticism is only possible as a theory of society (Habermas, 1970a:9).
For Adorno criticism does not merely entail that theses contradicting each 
other should be reformulated for the sake of the unanimity of a scientific 
context (Adorno, 1970:136). It is possible that the apparent contradiction 
resides in the field of investigation itself and that it would not be possible to 
rectify it through additional knowledge or clearer formulations (Adorno, 
1970:129). Precisely due to the societal engagement of neo-Marxism a 
revolutionary implication is associated with it  we only have to think about the 
student revolts of the sixties inspired by neo-Marxism.
7. The “melting pot” of the mid twentieth 
century
During the period in which the positivist philosophy of science dominated the 
scene Europe experienced two world wars and a general move away from the 
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Enlightenment trust in human reason. The pessimist tone of existentialist 
thphilosophy  Kierkegaard (already from the 19  century) Jaspers, Heidegger, 
and Sartre  was in the grip of an irrationalism that inspired Spengler to publish 
in 1918 his well-known “The Decline of the West” (Der Untergang des 
Abendlandes). This entire development transcended the scope (and 
limitations) of (neo-)positivism and within the Anglo-Saxon world is was 
accompanied by the growing influence of Wittgenstein, particularly his later 
philosophy as it was (posthumously) published in his Philosophische 
Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations”). Another concurrent 
movement took shape in the rise of a radically new philosophy of science, 
mainly inspired by Kuhn's work on Scientific Revolutions. Add to this the newly 
emerging prominence of the hermeneutical tradition (Dilthey, Gadamer) and 
on top of that the reinforced relativism introduced by postmodernism in its 
affirmation both of historical relativity and the interpretative ambiguities of 
language and of understanding, and the picture of a complex mix is 
completed.
Within this climate we may briefly return to the successes of mathematical 
physics  alluded to above in the discovery of Neptune  for not even 
mathematics escaped from this pessimistic disillusionment: The 
developments in the foundations of mathematics since 1900 are bewildering, 
and the present state of mathematics is anomalous and deplorable. The light 
of truth no longer illuminates the road to follow. In place of the unique, 
universally admired and universally accepted body of mathematics whose 
proofs, though sometimes requiring amendation, were regarded as the acme 
of sound reasoning, we now have conflicting approaches to mathematics. 
Beyond the logicist, intuitionist, and formalist bases, the approach through 
set theory alone gives many options. Some divergent and even conflicting 
positions are possible even within the other schools. Thus the constructivist 
movement within the intuitionist philosophy has many splinter groups. Within 
formalism there are choices to be made about what of metamathematics may 
be employed. Non-standard analysis, though not a doctrine of any one 
school, permits an alternative approach to analysis which may also lead to 
conflicting views. At the very least what was considered to be illogical and to 
be banished is now accepted by some schools as logically sound (Kline, 
1980:275-276).
The current intellectual climate of the West finds itself confronted with the 
consequences of a process of spiritual uprooting that actually started during 
the Renaissance but that only demonstrated its disintegrating effects in the 
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basic tenets of postmodernism and the claim that the days of the “grand 
meta-narratives” are bygone  of course with the one (“last”) exception: the 
9grand story that the grand stories are gone!
These developments does not entail that the entire academic world 
succumbed to the relativistic consequences of the mentioned developments, 
because amazingly enough the classical rationalistic scientism and its 
spiritual child, technicism continued to capture the spirit of many special 
scientists. It seems as if the most recent developments did not succeed in 
liberating themselves from the integral and directing power of the basic 
motive of nature and freedom (science ideal and personality ideal).
8. Culture and civilization
thThe dominance of modern humanism since the 15  century eroded the trust 
in (and acceptance of) ontic laws and ontic normativity. We have briefly 
mentioned that Kant even view human understanding as the formal law-giver 
of nature. The dialectical split between nature and freedom eventually (“is” 
and “ought to be” / “Sein” and “Sollen”)  particularly in the thought of the neo-
Kantian Baden school of philosophy  established the opposition of “facts” 
and “values”. In 1896 Wilhelm Windelband presented his influential rectoral 
oration: Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (see Windelband, 1924) in which 
a modern account is given of natural law and cultural norms. The latter 
domain is embedded in a new philosophy of values (Wertphilosophie). 
Windelband distinguishes between two different types of science: nomothetic 
and idiographic (the former sets out to grasp what is universal and the latter 
aims to understand the unique and individual). Rickert argues that we can 
subsume the 'world' under two different logical points of view: if we view it from 
the perspective of the universal it becomes nature (studied by the 
“generalizing natural sciences”); if we view it from the perspective of the 
unique and individual it becomes history (studied by the “individualizing 
2cultural sciences”  Rickert, 1913 :224).
In following Rickert and closely related to the distinctions used by Sorokin, 
MacIver differentiates between the “Physical Realm, The Realm of Organic 
Being” and “The Realm of Conscious Being” (MacIver, 1942:272). Within the 
latter he furthermore distinguishes between the cultural order, the 
10technological order and the social order (1942:273).
9  This reminds one of the humorous remark of Gadamer of the prejudice of Enlightenment against prejudices (cf  Gadamer, 1998:276)
10
 Schuurman considers the technicism of our time to be more fundamental than scientism or economism (see Schuurman, 1995:137 ff  and 
Dijsterhuis, 1961)
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In the 1965-edition of the text book written by MacIver and Page this threefold 
distinction reappears in the form of a bifurcation between civilization and 
culture (MacIver, 1965:498 ff.  the exposition below refers to this section of 
MacIver's work). Finally, within civilization a subdivision is made between the 
realms of the basic technology and the social technology.
A closer analysis of these distinctions will pave the way for introducing basic 
systematic distinctions intended to point the way in the direction of 
transcending the threat of scientific nihilism and relativism.
The basic technology of MacIver is directed towards human control over 
natural phenomena. It is the area of the engineer and the mechanic. This 
definition indeed captures the original meaning of the relation between the 
human being as subject and whatever is objectified through human cultural 
activities. Implicit in this remark is the assumption of functional modes of 
reality, that is to say, of universal conditions making possible the human 
experience of the how of processes and natural and social entities. Human 
culturally formative actions concerns a peculiar functional mode of reality, 
best designated as the cultural-historical aspect. However, since the 
Renaissance it was believed that humankind constructs the cultural world, 
without accepting any longer any given points of departure (starting-points). 
Such starting-points, best known as principles, ultimately condition human 
action in the sense that human endeavours are made possible by the various 
ontically given spheres of functional principles. Although such given 
(ontic/creational) principles are not valid per se, since they are dependent 
upon human intervention for being made valid, they are not themselves the 
product of human actions.
The cultural task of humankind is always guided by universal historical norms 
or principles  such as the principles of historical continuity (where 
disobedience leads to reactionary or revolutionary trends in history), historical 
differentiation and historical integration. In subjection to these (and other) 
historical principles we find the factual historical subject-object relation. This 
relation concerns the factual control (power) over things (and events) in 
nature.
These distinctions prompt us to ask: What is included in MacIver's “social 
technology”? MacIver states that the social technology points at the 
techniques directed to the regulation of the behaviour of human beings. 
Clearly MacIver here embarks upon the control over human beings. This 
phenomenon requires a distinction between subject-object relations and 
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subject-subject relations. Only the latter entails control in the sense of power 
over fellow human beings and it is always tied to a specific office. Only office 
bearers, due to the competence enclosed within the offices ccupied by them, 
possess the authority to control and regulate the activities of members of a 
particular societal totality. It is unfortunate that MacIver here introduces the 
domains of economics and politics as subdivisions of the social order  thus 
introducing the problematic whole-parts scheme in his theorizing about 
human society.
However, when MacIver proceeds with his treatment of the difference 
between civilization and culture, he uses the means-end scheme as decisive 
criterion. Subsequently, this yardstick is then specified in terms of the 
inner/outer distinction  finally ending up within the domain of values. A typing 
machine (and computers nowadays  DFMS), for example, belong(s) to the 
basic technological order, but the novel produced by it belongs to a different 
order. Similar things, so MacIver argues, are created because it is their direct 
function to provide something to us that we need. They are not to be seen as 
merely mediated since they are meant to be expressions of ourselves. They 
respond to a necessity within us, not to an outer necessity. They belong to the 
realm of culture  the the realm of values, of styles, of emotional attachments, of 
intellectual adventures and s oon. Culture, then, is supposed to be the 
antithesis of civilization. It is the expression of our nature in our modes of living 
and of thinking, in our everyday intercourse, in art, in literature, in religion, in 
recreation and enjoyment (MacIver, 1965:499). Whenever an object exists for 
the sole purpose of directly satisfying an existential function of human beings, 
it belongs to the domain of culture, and when it merely exists in service of 
something else that we desire, it belongs to the sphere of civilization.
These distinctions harbour fundamental problems. First of all, one cannot 
account for the peculiar nature of tools in terms of them. Human tools always 
display an inherent structural qualification. Their so-called foundational 
11function is only to be found in the above-mentioned cultural-historical aspect  
since they are formed by human beings under the guidance of their creatively 
free formative fantasy. However, they are also cultural-historically qualified, 
since they are made in order to produce something else. Therefore both Van 
Riessen and Schuurman characterizes human tools as having both a 
historical foundational and qualifying function). The latter remarks: All 
technical objects are exceptional in the sense that both their foundational and 
qualifying function are cultural or technical in nature (Schuurman, 1980:9 ff.; 
cf. Van Riessen, 1948:509).
11  Schuurman prefers to speak of the cultural function, since he regards 'history as the expression of the meaning-coherence of all modal 
aspects' (1980:379)
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The archeologist Narr emphasizes that the human formative fantasy must be 
able to invent something different from what is present to the senses  which 
requires that truly human tools must be made with the aid of (formed or 
unformed) tools. Even the making of simple stone tools as such requires “tool-
making tools” (“das Werkzeug zum Werkzeugherstellen”): “In this we see a 
trait transcending the known and expected behaviour of animals: It 
presupposes possibilities and achievements which we may view as 
essentially and specifically human in nature” (Narr, 1973:62).
From the cultural-historical qualifying function of tools, it follows that the 
formation of technical objects immediately corresponds to the formative 
desire of human beings. In terms of MacIver's distinction, this would entail that 
also technical objects should be seen as belonging to the realm of culture 
instead of to the realm of civilization!
The structural principle of any cultural object is characterized by these two 
functions: a foundational function and a qualifying function, but only technical 
objects are qualified by the cultural-historical aspect  all other types of objects 
are qualified by some other normative aspect. The use of any cultural object 
could only proceed in one of the following two possible ways: (i) actualizing 
12the internal structural destination of the object;  (ii) using the object for a 
differently qualified purpose  thus leaving its internal destination intact, 
unactualized. When a book is utilized to block the door, it is used for a different 
13purpose, leaving its internal destination undisclosed (ii).  The same 
perspective applies to technical tools: they could be used according to their 
internal qualifying function, namely to make something else, or they could be 
used without actualizing their internal cultural-historical qualifying function  
for example when they are bought or sold (economically qualified 
objectification).
Every cultural object may therefore be used according to its internal nature or 
as a means in service of a differently qualified end. But then it is impossible to 
classify certain cultural objects exclusively as means, namely those 
belonging to the 'basic technology', while all other objects are considered to 
fall within the privileged category of being both an end in themselves (then 
belonging to culture) and a means to an end (then belonging to civilization). 
This analysis shows that the criteria used by MacIver are not sufficient to 
account for the empirically observable subject-object relations in reality.
If the nature of the universal cultural historical mode is accepted, culture is the 
12  When a book is read, or when painting is appreciated in an aesthetic sense, and so on
13
 Another example: If you would use a coin to buy something, it is used according to its internal economical qualifying function  If it is 
used as an ornament it is socially objectified  without opening up its internal qualifying function  
outcome of subject-object relations, whereas civilization concerns the 
disclosure of human subject functions as well as the interplay between 
human subject-subject relaitons and subject object realtion. For example, 
lingual communication between two subjects is mediated by objective lingual 
signs. All human subject-subject relations are founded in subject-object 
relations.
The pitfall of an anchorless relativism is only transcended when ontic 
normativity  making possible all human subjectivity  is accepted. This 
acknowledgement at once entails that science ought to be appreciated as 
one of the core powers of our civilization, but only when its normative confines 
are observed within the context of our human cultural task to disclose the 
possiblities of God's creation intellectually may we hope to witness a fruitful 
scholarly and scientific development for the generations to come.
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